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Abstract
Are natural resources a blessing or a curse? In this paper we present a model in
which natural resources have a positive eﬀect on level of income and a negative eﬀect
on its growth rate. The positive and permanent eﬀect on income implies a welfare
gain. There is a growth eﬀect stemming from a composition eﬀect. However, we show
that this eﬀect can be oﬀset by having a large level of human capital. We test our
model using panel data for the period 1970-1990. We extend the usual speciﬁcations
for economic growth regressions by incorporating an interaction term between human
capital and natural resources, showing that high levels of human capital may outweigh
the negative eﬀects of the natural resource abundance on growth. We also review the
historical experience of Scandinavian countries, which in contrast to Latin America,
another region well endowed with natural resources, shows how it is possible to grow
fast based on natural resources.
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During the last decade many economists have returned to the familiar question of
whether there is any relationship between a country’s abundance of natural resources
and its rate of economic growth or level of income. Few, however, have asked under
what circumstances natural resources can serve as an engine of growth. Moreover,
the discussion has been limited to the study of the eﬀects on growth only, instead of
looking also at the level of income, even though the latter is more closely related to
welfare. In this paper we analyze both eﬀects. We show that the discovery of natural
resources leads to a decline in the rate of growth, but also to an increase in income
that raises welfare.
The economic history of the last two centuries shows mixed evidence in this re-
gard. During the nineteenth century and the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, several
countries underwent development experiences in which natural resources seem to have
been the engine of economic growth. The most notable cases include Australia, Scan-
dinavia and the United States ( See Wright, 1990 and Blomstrom and Meller, 1990,
among others). However, it is hard to ﬁnd successful experiences of such development
in the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, in many countries the natural
resources sector has been blamed for the underdevelopment or slow growth of the
economy. This lack of variation in experiences, of course, limits our ability to use
these more recent data to analyze the whole potential variety of actual experience
with natural resources and development.
The mainstream literature on economic growth has focused on technical change
and on the accumulation of physical and human capital, largely disregarding the in-
teraction between these two factors within diﬀerent economic structures. The main
exception has been the research on the eﬀects of openness on economic growth (Ed-
wards, 1997). This situation has generated a conceptual gap in our understanding of
the impact of the productive structure on economic growth.
During the 1970s many economists studied the macroeconomic eﬀects and changes
in the productive structure resulting from a shock to the natural resources sector—
the so-called Dutch disease.1 Nevertheless, this conceptual framework explains only
the real appreciation of the currency and the process of factor reallocation that ac-
1On the literature on Dutch disease, see, for example, Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1986).
1companies it, without deriving long-run implications for economic growth. However,
the idea behind the long-run eﬀects of the Dutch disease is that the real appreciation
that results from a natural resources boom is detrimental to export-led growth and
development.
To understand the eﬀects of Dutch disease on economic growth, it is necessary
to identify the long-run mechanisms that link shocks to the natural resources sec-
tor with the country’s productive structure and long-run performance. Matsuyama
(1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), and more recently Asea and Lahiri (1999), among
others, have attempted such an analysis. Yet the gap in our theoretical understanding
remains wide. This paper tries to narrow that gap by developing a stylized model of
two productive sectors, to consider both the dynamic eﬀects of endogenous growth
theory and the reallocative eﬀects derived from the Dutch disease literature. We
emphasize the interaction between natural resources and human capital, as well as
their eﬀects on levels of income and rates of economic growth, in order to explain
why countries with an abundance of natural resources and with high levels of human
capital may be able to reach a higher level of welfare. Moreover, we show that, under
certain assumptions, a high level of human capital may oﬀset the negative eﬀects of
an abundance of natural resources on economic growth. These facts are consistent
with our discussion on the Scandinavian experience of development that we present
in section 2, and that motivates our theoretical model.
One can distinguish two main reasons why the presence of natural resources might
exert negative eﬀects on growth and development. The ﬁrst is that weak institutions
generate conditions that give rise to “voracity eﬀects,” through which interest groups
devote their energies to trying to capture the economic rents from natural resources
(Lane and Tornell, 1996). The allocation of talent in such an economy is distorted,
and resources are diverted to unproductive activities.
The second reason, which focuses on the productive structure of the economy, is
related to the allocation of resources among diﬀerent activities with diﬀerent spillover
eﬀects on aggregate growth. For example, if a given stock of capital can be allocated
either to the exploitation of natural resources or to the production of goods subject to
endogenous growth, the presence of abundant natural resources may cause capital to
be diverted to their extraction, thus diminishing the resources available for growth-
enhancing activities. We follow this second idea, but since, in a world with capital
2mobility, the constraint on a country’s available physical capital stock may be relaxed,
we focus on human capital, which is less mobile (Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin,
1995).2
The model presented in section 3 incorporates the following stylized facts:
² According to Chenery and Syrquin (1975), the share of natural resources pro-
duction in total output and the fraction of the labor force working in the natural
resources sector both decline over the course of a country’s development.
² An increase in a country’s endowment of natural resources induces a shift in the
fraction of human capital working in the industrial sector toward the natural
resources sector, as has been traditionally understood in the study of Dutch
disease.
The main results of our model derive from the fact that the rate of growth of an
economy is a weighted average of the rate of growth of the natural resources sector
and that of the industrial sector. The assumptions of our model imply that the
natural resources sector uses a constant amount of human capital and does not grow,
whereas the industrial sector can add human capital indeﬁnitely and grow at a positive
rate. Thus a larger endowment of natural resources increases income per capita but
reduces the rate of growth of the economy by expanding the natural resources sector.
A greater abundance of human capital generates faster growth for a given endowment
of natural resources. In this regard we capture the idea that natural resources limit
growth so long as the level of human capital is low, so that there are not enough
resources to devote to growth-enhancing activities. We could also assume decreasing
returns in the industrial sector by including physical capital, but that would make the
model less tractable and deviate from the main eﬀect we want to examine, namely,
the role of human capital. In addition, we could presume that natural resources are
also able to generate endogenous growth, for example by inducing spillovers to other
activities through research and development, but we want to focus on the concept of
a natural resources sector that, as the economy develops, reduces its share in total
output.
2Even in periods of low capital mobility, foreign direct investment has traditionally been available
to exploit natural resources.
3In Section 4 we analyze the empirical implications of the model, studying the
eﬀects of natural resources on GDP per capita and on its rate of growth. We ﬁnd
that, when interactions with human capital are ignored, an increased abundance of
natural resources reduces the rate of growth but increases income. When we add to
the regression analysis a term that interacts human capital and natural resources, we
ﬁnd that, for high levels of human capital, the rate of growth also increases with the
abundance of natural resources. Section 5 concludes.
Scandinavia is perhaps the most striking case of development based on natural
resources. For this reason, we motivated our theoretical model by presenting in
the next section the experiences of Scandinavia and Latin America. As our review
indicates, since the second half of the nineteenth century, a high level of human capital
along with other factors made successful development possible for the ﬁrst group of
natural resources-rich countries.3
2 Human Capital and Natural Resources:
Scandinavia vs. Latin America
A closer look at the history of Scandinavia and Latin America shows that, during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both groups of countries enjoyed similar
levels of GDP per capita, and, more important from this paper’s perspective, both
were mostly exporters of natural resources. In 1870 Finland, Norway, and Sweden
had incomes per capita of $1107, $1303 and $1664, respectively, whereas Argentina
and Chile had incomes per capita of $1311 and $1153 , respectively. However, the
long-run evolution of the two groups of countries was quite diﬀerent: the Scandina-
vian countries developed, but the Latin American countries did not. By 1990 the
divergence in income levels was striking. Whereas Finland, Norway, and Sweden by
that year had incomes per capita of $16604, $16897 and $17695, respectively, Ar-
gentina and Chile had fallen far behind, with incomes per capita of $6581 and $6380
dollars, respectively (table 1).4
3See Leamer (2003) for more details on the relationship among distance, natural resources, and
trade.
4All ﬁgures come from Maddison (1995).
4Table 1: Comparative evolution of Income and Exports Per Capita. (1990 Geary
Khamis Dollars)
GDP per capita Growth Exports Exports
GDP per capita Growth
1870 1913 1990 1870-1913 1870 1913 1990 1870-1913
Denmark 1927 3764 17953 1.6 166 501 7642 3.3
Finland 1107 2050 16604 1.4 177 528 5222 3.9
Netherlands 2640 3950 16569 0.9 478 702 9346 2.3
Norway 1303 2275 16897 1.3 129 349 9145 3.2
Sweden 1664 3096 17695 1.5 171 475 6543 3.1
UK 3263 5032 16302 1.0 417 923 3363 2.8
Australia 3801 5505 16417 0.9 281 704 2732 4.8
Canada 1620 4213 19599 2.2 194 515 4934 4.1
New Zealand 3115 5178 13994 1.2 344 729
USA 2457 5307 21866 1.8 62 197 1765 2.2
Argentina 1311 3797 6581 2.5 124 257 372 5.2
Brazil 740 839 4812 0.3 87 80 235 1.9
Chile 1153 2653 6380 2.0 85 201 802 3.4
Colombia 1236 4917 48 51 242 2.0
Mexico 710 1467 4917 1.7 26 158 341 5.4
Peru 676 1037 3000 1.0 78 94 156 5.3
Source: Maddison (1995) and Bravo-Ortega (1999).
5A variety of factors explain these diﬀerences in growth outcomes, and it is beyond
the scope of this paper to analyze all of them. Instead we emphasize the most common
factors identiﬁed in the literature, but we also stress the diﬀerence in their initial
endowment of human capital, which has not been suﬃciently appreciated despite the
large diﬀerences on this score between the two regions (table 2).5
Table 2: Social Infrastructure Indicators 1870-1910
Railroad Primary Literacy
(Km) Enrollment Rate
1870 1910 1870 1910 1870-90
Denmark 770 3445 58.3 65.8 99
Finland 483 3356 26.4 89
Netherlands 1419 3190 59.1 70.3 97
Norway 359 2976 60.8 68.6 98
Sweden 1727 13829 56.9 66.9 98
UK 21558 32184 48.7 78.5 96
Australia 69.6 89.2 97
Canada 4211 39799 75 88.2 90
New Zealand 50 90.9
USA 85170 386714 72 97 88
Argentina 732 27713 20.9 37 46
Brazil 745 21326 5.8 10.8 14.8
Chile 732 5944 18.7 38.8 30.3
Colombia 0 988 5.9 20.8
Mexico 349 19748 16 24.8 22.2
Peru 669 2995 15.3
Source: Railroad from Mitchell (1998a and b). Enrollment rates from Benavot and Riddle
(1988). Literacy from O’Rourke and Williamson (1995), except Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
whose rates were taken from Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloﬀ (1997). The ﬁgures for
Brazil and Chile correspond to 1890, and those for Mexico to 1900.
Many have argued that the reason for the success of the Scandinavian transfor-
mation lies in how open these economies were. O’Rourke and Williamson (1995)
establish that most of Sweden’s catch-up was due to mass migration, international
5More recently, Maloney (2002) has studied in more detail this and other issues related to the
capacity of resource-rich economies to absorb and develop technology.
6capital ﬂows, and trade, and that this experience seems to apply to the rest of Scan-
dinavia as well. This explanation assigns only modest importance to the relatively
high level of educational attainment in the Scandinavian countries.
Nevertheless, what has not been widely recognized in the literature is that the
Scandinavian countries were not the only resource-rich countries to experience high
rates of economic growth during the late nineteenth century—the so-called Scan-
dinavian catch-up. Some Latin American countries did so as well. Argentina and
Chile experienced rapid growth, which by the late 1920s had raised their incomes per
capita to levels above those in Finland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. In these
two Latin American countries, as in Scandinavia, international trade played a funda-
mental role. The openness of their economies and their comparative advantages—in
beef and wheat for Argentina, and in nitrates for Chile—contributed to that growth.
However, it is diﬃcult to explain the greater persistence of growth in Scandinavia
than in Latin America without remarking on the educational gap that emerged be-
tween the two groups of countries over the period 1870-1910, and which remained
large throughout the twentieth century (table 2).
Bravo-Ortega (1999) argues that, despite some common characteristics, both
groups of countries diﬀered sharply in terms of income inequality, access to edu-
cation, trade policies, and geographical location. By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the Scandinavian countries had implemented land redistributions and edu-
cational reforms. No similar transformations occurred in Latin America during that
time. With regard to trade policies, whereas the Scandinavian countries, until 1900,
tended consistently toward free trade, most Latin American governments (except Ar-
gentina and Chile) relied on trade tariﬀs as their principal source of income. Thus,
by the late nineteenth century, both groups of countries had quite diﬀerent structural
conditions for accommodating the consequences of international trade.
This comparison of regional experiences conﬁrms that education mattered in the
nineteenth century. It was important in the development of new industrial activities
in Scandinavia and in the economic and political accommodation of external shocks.
A well-educated labor force facilitated the movement of workers across economic ac-
tivities and assisted in sectoral restructuring as new industrial activities developed as
part of the process of natural resource exploitation. Some examples of the beneﬁts
of this educational advantage are evident in studies of the changes in the industrial
7structure of the Scandinavian countries during the late nineteenth century. Examples
include Denmark’s shift from the export of grains to the export of livestock in the
1870’s, the shift in Sweden and Norway from lumbering to pulp production, and Swe-
den’s adoption and improvement of British metallurgical techniques, which allowed
the Swedes to develop their iron and steel industries.6 An adjustment that in Latin
America would have provoked a serious social crisis, as did the collapse of nitrates
production in Chile, which led to a mass migration to the cities, proved instead for
Scandinavia to be an episode of Schumpeterian creative destruction.
An alternative interpretation, based on an analysis of inequality and growth, is
that access to primary education is simply a good proxy for reduced income inequality
in Scandinavia. Increased equality would have contributed to a growing domestic
market and would have furthered the development of new sectors.
Of course, there are many possible reasons why two regions that, more than a
century ago, were similar in terms of income per capita and abundance of natural
resources subsequently diverged, with very diﬀerent patterns of development and
economic growth. Clearly a salient diﬀerence, however, as the empirical analysis of
this paper will show, was the level of human capital.
3 The Model
The model that we present follows from previous work on growth and natural re-
sources starting with Solow (1974). Unlike Solow, however, we do not consider natural
resources as an essential input for the production of industrial goods.7
We consider a small, open economy with two productive sectors: a natural re-
sources sector and an industrial sector. Both utilize human capital along with the
ﬁxed endowments of the factors speciﬁc to each sector. We assume that the natural
resources sector exhibits decreasing returns to human capital, whereas the industrial
sector exhibits constant returns to scale. All production is sold in the international
market, and the proceeds are used to buy a third, consumption good. The prices of
the three goods are determined in the world market and therefore exogenous in the
6Heckscher (1968) notes that Sweden built the world’s ﬁrst industrial pulp processing plant, and
covers the details of Swedish development of metallurgical techniques.
7More recently, Gylfason and Zoega (2002) also follow Solow’s assumption about the essential
role of natural resources in production.
8model. We use the price of the industrial good as a numeraire, and p1 to denote the
price of the natural resources good and p2 the price of the consumption good.
Thus the production functions for the natural resources and industrial sectors can
be expressed as follows:
YNR = R ¢ H±
R and YI = a ¢ HI (1)
respectively.
We denote the capital speciﬁc to the natural resources sector by R. It represents
a measure of the endowment of natural resources and its impact on output. Thus
R considers such factors as the quality of the soil, the climate, and the quality of
mineral deposits. 8
The capital speciﬁc to the industrial sector is denoted by a and can be interpreted
as technological (or social) infrastructure. As usual, the subscripts on H (or L)
indicate the productive sector to which the human capital (or labor) is allocated.
Hence the economy faces the following constraint for the endowment of human
capital in each period:
HI + HR = H: (2)
To avoid scale eﬀects, we work with just one representative ﬁrm for each sector,
owned by a representative agent. We assume that the representative agent owns both
ﬁrms. Total labor in the economy is constant and equal to L, which we normalize to
1, and hence all variables are expressed in per capita terms. The proportion of labor
and human capital allocated to the natural resources sector is equal to LR = HR=H,
and that allocated to the industrial sector is LI = 1 ¡ LR = HI=H.
Thus the representative agent must choose the allocation of human labor across
sectors and how much should be invested in human capital.
The agent solves the following problem:
8This assumption is similar to those used by Matsuyama (1992). Allowing for an optimal path of
extraction for nonrenewable natural resources would imply, in our setup, a decreasing R over time
and, hence, decreasing output in the natural resources sector. This result would reinforce some of








st L ¢ ˙ Ht = ˙ Ht = Y ¡ p2 ¢ ct
Y = a ¢ (HI) + p1 ¢ R ¢ H±
R
HI + HR = H = L ¢ H:
(3)
From this setup we derive the following ﬁve propositions, which are the basis of the
empirical analysis presented in the next section. The ﬁrst four propositions assume
conditions for the existence of two productive sectors (assumption 1). Appendix A
provides the solution of the model and the proofs of the propositions.
Assumption 1 The parameters of the model are such that in equilibrium both sec-
tors have production greater than zero. This is equivalent to imposing, in period 0,
HR = H¢LR = ( a
p1¢R¢±)
1
±¡1 < H0 and that a > ¯; where H0 represents the endowment
of human capital in the economy at period 0.
Proposition 1 In the steady state the growth rate of income per capita, consumption
per capita, and human capital are equal to °ss = 1
¾(a ¡ ¯)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that, in the steady state, the rate of growth of the economy is constant and
depends only on the technology used in the industrial sector and not on the endow-
ment of natural resources. This is a direct consequence of the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the steady state, the fraction of the labor force allocated to the
natural resources sector converges asymptotically to zero. Output and human capital
in the natural resource sector are constant.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that LR, the fraction of the labor force working in the natural resources










The fraction of the labor force working in the natural resources sector is inversely
proportional to the level of human capital per capita, H, and positively related to
10the amount of the speciﬁc factor in the natural resources sector. Hence, as long
as human capital increases, the labor force in the natural resources sector decreases
proportionately, and the level of human capital remains constant.
Now we turn to the eﬀect of R on the level of income.
Proposition 3 An increase in the speciﬁc factor in the natural resources sector re-
sults in an increase in income per capita.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The next proposition considers the growth eﬀect of natural resources and the
interplay with human capital. The proof redeﬁnes the variables in our system in
order to arrive at a system of two nonlinear diﬀerential equations, which are then
linearized around the steady state of the auxiliary dynamic system.
Result 1 The eﬀect of an increase in the speciﬁc factor of the natural resources
sector will be a lower growth rate of income per capita in the transition to the steady
state. However, for economies with abundant human capital, the growth-reducing
eﬀects of an increase in the endowment of natural resources are diminished.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result shows, ﬁrst, that for low levels of human capital the growth eﬀect
of natural resources is negative, although the economy has higher income. A larger
endowment in natural resources implies a larger share of total output in the natural
resources sector. However, the greater the level of human capital, the smaller the
crowding-out eﬀect on the labor force of the industrial sector. The impact on growth
can be understood by noting that the rate of growth is an average of the rates of
growth in both sectors. Given that the natural resources sector has zero growth, the
average declines whenever the natural resource share of total input increases. But
when human capital is large, this composition eﬀect is small.9
9Interestingly, Vincent (1997) notes that Malaysia’s growth has behaved consistently with the
assumptions and results of our model. Malaysia has three main regions: the peninsular main-
land, Sabah, and Sarawak. Today peninsular Malaysia’s economy is mostly based on manufactures,
whereas the other two regions remain natural resources-based economies. Whereas in 1970 the pri-
mary sector accounted for 40 to 50 percent of output in all three regions, by 1990 it accounted
just for 20 percent in the peninsular region and 60 percent in Sabah and Sarawak. Perhaps most
interesting, whereas peninsular Malaysia’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent
during that period, those of Sabah and Sarawak grew at 2.9 and 3.4 percent, respectively.




Income path for an economy with 
natural resources
Figure 1 illustrates these eﬀects. The economy converges with an increasing
growth rate to the steady-state rate of growth. During this process the natural
resources sector diminishes in relative importance. For two economies with the same
level of human capital, the one with natural resources will have a higher income but
will grow more slowly. But the economy with a higher level of human capital will be
closer to the high steady-state rate of growth. For simplicity, and to illustrate these
points more clearly, we have abstracted from the convergence eﬀect, but the model
can be interpreted as converging to a Solow-type growth based on the exogenous
growth of productivity in the industrial sector, but with a dynamic similar to that
12described here.
Another interesting issue that this model allows us to explain is the existence of a
zero-growth equilibrium in which the economy produces only in the natural resources
sector. Assumption 1 ensures that the economy will never specialize entirely in natural
resources. However, the next proposition analyzes what we call the “poverty trap of
natural resources.” In this case we assume that, given productivity in each of the
two sectors and the initial level of human capital, the economy will produce only in
the natural resources sector, because it is not proﬁtable to devote resources to the
industrial sector. This is formalized in the following assumption.
Assumption 2 The following inequalities hold:





Note that the ﬁrst condition simply implies relative abundance of natural resources
with respect to the speciﬁc factor in the industrial sector, whereas the second implies
that the economy will exhaust the returns to human capital in the natural resources
sector.
Proposition 4 Under the conditions of assumption 2, the economy will specialize in
the production of the natural resources good, with zero growth of income per capita
and zero rate of accumulation of human capital in the steady state.
Proof. See Appendix A.
So far we have proved that, under the proper assumptions, an increment in the
speciﬁc factor in the natural resources sector will increase the level of income per
capita, but will diminish the rate of growth in the economy. However, as shown
in proposition 4, it is possible to reduce this negative eﬀect by increasing the level
of human capital per capita. Hence the model presented here explains the stylized
facts mentioned in the introduction. Moreover, as the latter proposition shows, the
economy may become stagnant in a no-growth equilibrium, when it has a low level
of human capital and low industrial productivity.
Finally, an extension of the model would allow us to incorporate the impact of
political economy factors on the dynamics of the economy. Suppose that initially the
13economy produces in both sectors, and consider the existence of interest groups that
receive the rents from at least one of the speciﬁc factors. Now suppose that these
groups are able to tax the return on human capital. The impact of this tax will
have three main consequences: First, it will reduce the return and the incentives for
human capital accumulation, thereby reducing the growth rate of the economy over
the transition and in the steady state. Second, the lower return to human capital will
induce, ceteris paribus, a larger fraction of the labor force and a larger share of GDP
to be allocated to the natural resources sector. Third, under some circumstances the
tax would inhibit the development of the industrial sector, driving the economy into
the “poverty trap” described by proposition 4. The same mechanisms operate when
the owners of the natural resources sector are able to tax the return to the speciﬁc
factor in the industrial sector. The tax charged to the speciﬁc factor will decrease
its return and the productivity of human capital, which will ultimately imply a lower
growth rate.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Previous Empirical Results
Sachs and Warner, in a series of papers beginning with Sachs and Warner (1995),
have produced the most persuasive evidence to date connecting economic growth and
relative abundance of natural resources. Subsequent work includes Lane and Tornell
(1996), Feenstra, Madani, Yang, and Liang (1997), Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega
(1999), Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001), Asea and Lahiri
(1999), and Gylfason (2001), among others. The main ﬁnding of Sachs and Warner
(1995), using cross-sectional regressions, is a robust negative relationship between
economic growth and natural resources. They corroborate this relationship with dif-
ferent measures of resource abundance, such as the share of mining production in
GDP, land per capita, and the share of natural resource exports in GDP.10 Finally,
Sachs and Warner ﬁnd that a 1-standard-deviation increase in natural resources ex-
ports as a fraction of the GDP would imply a slower rate of growth on the order of
10It is worth mentioning that the inclusion of natural resources exports (as a fraction of GDP) as
an explanatory variable can be derived directly from the model we have developed. For more details
see appendix A.
141 percentage point per year.
Gylfason et al. (1999) postulate that the natural resources sector creates and needs
less human capital than other productive sectors, which is similar to the assumption
of this paper. A larger primary sector induces an appreciation of the currency, which
makes the development of a skill-intensive sector diﬃcult. Thus the model they de-
velop predicts an inverse relationship between real exchange rate volatility and human
capital accumulation and, hence, growth. Similarly, they predict a positive relation-
ship between external debt and proﬁtability in the secondary (industrial) sector and
growth. However, the evidence they provide regarding these two explanatory vari-
ables is at best mixed: exchange rate volatility is not statistically signiﬁcant, and
external debt is statistically signiﬁcant but has the wrong sign.
According to Gylfason et al. (1999), the share of the labor force in the primary
sector can be used as an explanatory variable. However, they ﬁnd it to be statistically
signiﬁcant only when human capital is excluded from the regressions. This result may
be due to multicollinearity, which our model can explain, since the fraction of the
labor force (or human capital) employed in the primary sector depends on the level
of human capital. Thus Gylfason et al. (1999) ﬁnd that “an increase in either the
share of the primary sector in the labor force or in the share of the primary exports
on total exports from 5% to 30% from one country or period to another reduces per
capita growth by about 0.5% percent per year, other things being equal.” In short,
the model we have presented is consistent with the results found by Gylfason et al.
(1999) related to the size of the labor force in the primary sector.
In a multisectoral study, Feenstra et al. (1997) test the hypothesis of semien-
dogenous growth using data on bilateral trade between the United States and South
Korea and between the United States and Taiwan. Their study focuses on sixteen
industrial sectors, for which they test whether changes in the relative varieties of in-
puts aﬀect the growth rate of relative total factor productivity between South Korea
and Taiwan. They classify seven of these sectors as primary and nine as secondary,
deﬁning ﬁrms that use raw materials and natural resources as inputs as belonging to
the primary sector. Their results show that variety of inputs aﬀects the growth rate of
total factor productivity in seven secondary sectors but only one primary sector. The
mining sector displays a positive relationship, although this eﬀect disappears after
controlling for imperfect competition. The remaining sectors in the primary sector
15present mixed evidence, with either a positive, a negative, or an insigniﬁcant eﬀect
of variety of inputs on the growth rate of total factor productivity.
However, not all the existing evidence supports the hypothesis of a negative im-
pact of natural resources on economic development. Davis (1995) compares the long-
run economic development indicators of minerals-based economies and non-minerals-
based developing economies.11 He ﬁnds that the minerals-based economies as a group
signiﬁcantly outperform the non-minerals-based economies. More recently, Rigobon
and Manzano (2001) have found that Sachs and Warner’s results are not robust to
small changes in econometric procedure when panel data are used. They speciﬁ-
cally analyze the impact on growth of natural resources exports as a share of GDP.
They ﬁnd that when the model is estimated on panel data using ﬁxed eﬀects, the
negative impact of natural resources on growth vanishes, but that it remains in the
cross-sectional estimations. Rigobon and Manzano argue that the high prices on
commodities during the 1970s led developing countries to use them as collateral for
debt. During the 1980s, commodity prices fell sharply, leaving developing countries
with massive debts and a reduced ﬂow of foreign resources with which to pay it back.
Finally, Lederman and Maloney (2002) ﬁnd that their preferred measure of natural re-
source abundance appears to be positively correlated with economic growth, and that
export concentration reduces growth. They use as a measure of resource abundance
the net exports of natural resources per worker.
4.2 Empirical Methodology and Results
We estimate the main empirical implications of our model using panel data for the
period 1970-90. The data used in the regressions are from the Penn World Tables, the
Barro and Lee (1994) Educational Data Set, and the World Tables from the World
Bank (1993-96). We describe the data and their sources in more detail in appendix
B.
We regress the growth rate of GDP per capita on various explanatory variables,
using random and ﬁxed eﬀects to test the robustness of our measures of natural
resources.12 We also use instrumental variables in order to overcome the possible
11These indicators include life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, and share of the population
with access to safe water and sanitation.
12Data limitations prevent estimation by some other procedures recommended in the literature,
16bias introduced by measurement error in our proxy for human capital.13. Given that
we are interested in determining the possible eﬀect of natural resource abundance
on economic growth, we extend traditional growth regressions by incorporating the
share of natural resources exports in GDP and in total exports as proxies of resource
abundance (Natural).14 As control variables we use human capital, measured by
average years of schooling among the over-25 population (H); government expenditure
as a fraction of GDP (G); openness, measured as exports plus imports divided by
GDP (OPEN); terms-of-trade shocks (TT);15 investment as a fraction of GDP (I);
and initial income (y). All the variables are measured at the beginning of each
period of the panel. However, as a robustness test, we also estimate regressions
using average values of some variables for each period. All the estimations use either
period dummies and regional dummies for Africa and Latin America, or ﬁxed eﬀects,
depending on the estimation technique (DREG).16
Our benchmark regression for the rate of growth, °y, is the traditional growth
equation extended by the inclusion of natural resources, as estimated by several au-
thors and as implied by our model.17 This regression can be written as
°yi;t = ®0t + ®1 ¢ yi;t + ®2 ¢ Ii;t + ®3 ¢ Hi;t + ®4 ¢ Naturali;t+
+ ®5 ¢ Gi;t + ®6 ¢ OPENi;t + ®7 ¢ TTi;t + ®8 ¢ DREGi + "i;t (5)
where i is a country index and t indicates the number of the cross-section regression
of the panel.
In a second stage we include an interaction eﬀect between human capital and
such as the Generalized Method of Moments, as proposed by Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996).
13For a revision of this point see, for example, Krueger and Lindahl (1999).
14As in most of the recent literature, we use the World Tables CD-ROM as a data source and
deﬁne natural resources exports as the sum of exports of fuels and nonfuel primary products.
15We replicate the measure of terms-of-trade shock developed by Easterly, Pritchett, and Summers
(1993). See appendix B.
16For a detailed discussion of the control variables see Sachs and Warner (1995) and Temple
(1999). In our empirical speciﬁcation we do not rule out the conditional convergence hypothesis;
hence we include the lagged value of income per capita. Given the theoretical framework, it may
be possible to recover conditional convergence to a given growth rate after including a decreasing
marginal return to capital.
17Because in our model the economy exports all of its output, we can use either the share of
natural resources exports in GDP or the share of natural resources exports in total exports as the
proxy for resource abundance. See equation 30
17natural resources. Therefore we estimate the following regression:
°yi;t = ®0t + ®1 ¢ yi;t + ®2 ¢ Ii;t + ®3 ¢ Hi;t + ®4 ¢ Naturali;t+
+ ®5 ¢ Gi;t + ®6 ¢ OPENi;t + ®7 ¢ TTi;t+
+ ®8 ¢ Hi;t ¢ Naturali;t + ®9DREGi + "i;t (6)
Equation (6) incorporates the interaction term between natural resources and
human capital. This term allows us to test whether the negative eﬀect of natural
resources on the rate of growth decreases as human capital increases, as implied by
our model. Hence we must interpret natural resources exports as a fraction of GDP
and total exports as proxies of the speciﬁc factor in our model, R.
Before proceeding with the regression analysis, we show in ﬁgures 2 and 3 scat-
terplots of growth and income, respectively, against natural resource exports in our
sample of countries. Figure 2 shows a negative relationship. In the case of income,
there seems to be no bivariate relationship, although, as shown below, this relation-
ship is positive when we control for other variables.
Table 3 presents results of regressions testing whether there is a negative relation-
ship between natural resources and economic growth as modeled by equation (5); in
these regressions we use instrumental variables in order to overcome the measurement
error in our human capital variables, which Krueger and Lindahl (1999) have docu-
mented. We use as instruments the ﬁve-year-lagged value of our measure of human
capital and the ﬁve-year-lagged value of government expenditure in education.
In Table 3, regression 3.1 shows the traditional result of Sachs and Warner for a
panel estimation. However, regression 3.2 corroborates the results of Manzano and
Rigobon (2002), who ﬁnd that the signiﬁcance of the share of natural resources exports
in total GDP is not robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects. Regression 3.3 instead
uses the share of natural resources exports in total exports as a proxy for resource
abundance. This variable turns out to be statistically and economically signiﬁcant
and robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects, as shown in regression 3.4. Another vari-
able that is not robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects is government expenditure as
a fraction of GDP. Regression 3.5 excludes this variable without altering the size and
signiﬁcance of the other explanatory variables, and without reducing the R2. Human
capital is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the random eﬀects estimations, but only at
18the 10% level in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations. Openness, investment, and the terms of
trade are signiﬁcant regardless of the estimation method. We also perform the Haus-
man test to determine whether the random eﬀects or the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation is
more appropriate for each measure of natural resources. In both cases we reject the
null hypothesis that there are no systematic diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients estimated
by the two methods.
Table 3: Determinants of Economic Growth (3.1-3.5). Instrumental Variables Esti-
mations. Fixed (F.E.) and Random Eﬀects (R.E.)
3:1 3:2 3:3 3:4 3:5
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
R.E. F.E. R.E. F.E. F.E
log(Income) -0.023 -0.092 -0.027 -0.090 -0.090
(0:004)¤¤¤ (0:013)¤¤¤ (0:004)¤¤¤ (0:012)¤¤¤ (0:012)¤¤¤
Openness 0.019 0.043 0.008 0.043 0.043
(0:006)¤¤¤ (0:017)¤¤¤ (0.005) (0:015)¤¤¤ (0:015)¤¤¤
Investment 0.063 0.105 0.064 0.088 0.088
(0:027)¤¤ (0:044)¤¤ (0:027)¤¤ (0:043)¤¤ (0:043)¤¤
Government Exp. -0.100 -0.024 -0.106 -0.012
(0:025)¤¤¤ (0.048) (0:025)¤¤¤ (0.047)
Human 0.004 0.023 0.005 0.021 0.021
(0:001)¤¤¤ (0:012)¤ (0:001)¤¤¤ (0:012)¤ (0:012)¤
Natural Resources (XNR
Y )( -0.057 0.026
(0:016)¤¤¤ (0.035)
Natural Resources II (XNR
TX ) -0.029 -0.031 -0.032
(0:007)¤¤¤ (0:014)¤¤ (0:014)¤¤
Terms of Trade 0.195 0.299 0.206 0.285 0.287
(0:049)¤¤¤ (0:063)¤¤¤ (0:048)¤¤¤ (0:060)¤¤¤ (0:059)¤¤¤
R2 within 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.37
Observations 326 326 326 326 326
Standard errors in parentheses; ¤ signiﬁcant at 10 percent ; ¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5 percent;
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 percent. All the random eﬀects regressions are estimated with regional
dummies for African and Latin American countries.
Thus the results in Table 3 show an elasticity of the growth rate with respect to
the relative abundance of natural resources (measured as a share of total exports) of
around ¡0:03. The estimations largely support the hypothesis that natural resources
19aﬀect growth through their impact on the productive structure, even when the esti-
mates control for investment, trade policy, ﬁscal policy, and shocks to the terms of
trade.
Table 4 reports the results of regressions using the level of income per capita
instead of the growth rate as the dependent variable, controlling for the same set
of variables as before, with the obvious exception that the lagged value of income
replaces that of the growth rate. Regressions 4.1 and 4.2 show that the share of
natural resources exports in GDP is positively correlated with income. Whereas in
the random eﬀects estimation this variable is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, in the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation it is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. Regressions 4.3 and 4.4
substitute the share of natural resources exports in total exports for the share in
GDP as a regressor. In the random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects estimation this variable
is insigniﬁcant at the 5% level, although it is still correlated positively with income.
Thus the empirical evidence in Tables 3 and 4 conﬁrms two of the main predictions
of the model: a positive eﬀect of natural resource abundance on income per capita
and a negative eﬀect on the rate of growth. We note that it is the share of natural
resources in GDP that is positively correlated with income, but it is the share of
natural resources in total exports that is negatively correlated with the growth rate.
These results may indicate that countries well endowed with natural resources enjoy
greater welfare, as indicated by Davis (1995) and suggested by our model. The
signiﬁcance of natural resources exports in explaining the growth rate may ﬁt the
predictions of our model. However, it may also indicate that export concentration is
damaging for growth, as suggested by Lederman and Maloney (2002).
We also estimated but do not report speciﬁcations in which we did not control for
investment. The natural resources coeﬃcient and its signiﬁcance remained largely un-
changed, which we interpret as indicating that the negative eﬀect of natural resources
on growth does not operate through the investment channel but rather through the
relative productivity among sectors, and consequently through their relative sizes.18
Table 5 shows the eﬀect of the interaction between natural resources and human
capital using instrumental variables. In regression 5.1 neither the interaction term
18Gylfason et al. (1999) consistently ﬁnd that the share of the labor force employed in the primary
sector (farming, forestry, hunting, and ﬁshing) adversely aﬀects the rate of growth. Indeed, they
found this variable to be more robust than the measures of human capital they utilized.
20Table 4: Determinants of Level of Income. Instrumental Variables estimations. Fixed
(F.E.) and Random Eﬀects (R.E.)
4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4
Income Income Income Income
R.E. F.E. R.E. F.E.
Openness 0.313 0.394 0.396 0.465
(0:083)¤¤¤ (0:094)¤¤¤ (0:075)¤¤¤ (0:086)¤¤¤
Investment 1.105 0.969 1.075 0.934
(0:254)¤¤¤ (0:256)¤¤¤ (0:258)¤¤¤ (0:256)¤¤¤
Government Exp. -0.506 -0.198 -0.496 -0.203
(0:271)¤ (0.283) (0:275)¤¤ (0.283)
Human 0.202 0.180 0.198 0.166
(0:022)¤¤¤ (0:070)¤¤¤ (0:022)¤¤¤ (0:070)¤¤
Natural Resources (XNR
Y ) 0.471 0.398
(0:192)¤¤ (0:209)¤
Natural Resources II (XNR
TX ) -0.027 0.007
(0.083) (0.087)
Terms of Trade 0.833 0.707 0.707 0.572
(0:326)¤¤ (0:333)¤¤ (0:326)¤¤ (0:324)¤
R2 within 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40
Observations 336 336 336 336
Standard errors in parentheses; ¤ signiﬁcant at 10 percent ;¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ¤¤¤
signiﬁcant at 1 percent. All the random eﬀects regressions are estimated with regional
dummies for African and Latin American countries.
21nor the human capital variable is statistically signiﬁcant beyond the 10 percent level,
but the null hypothesis that both coeﬃcients are zero is rejected. In regressions 5.2
and 5.3 only one of the two variables is statistically signiﬁcant, but again the null
hypothesis that both coeﬃcients equal zero is rejected. In regressions 5.1 and 5.2 the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term reaches a higher statistical signiﬁcance than that
on human capital alone. For this reason, and given the speciﬁcation of our model, we
estimate a set of equations (regressions 5.4 to 5.7) that include human capital only
through the interaction eﬀect with natural resources. In these new speciﬁcations both
the coeﬃcient on natural resources and that on its interaction term are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations, and at the 5 percent
level in the random eﬀects estimations. We also perform the Hausman test to de-
termine whether the random or the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation is more appropriate for
each measure of natural resources. In both cases we reject the null hypothesis that
there is no systematic diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients estimated by the two methods.
Given the economic signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on the interaction term, we
investigate whether it is possible not only to decrease but also to change the sign of
the eﬀect of natural resources on growth. Therefore, based on the coeﬃcient of the
interaction term, we solve for the number of years of schooling at which it is possible
to recover a net positive eﬀect of natural resources on growth. This is equivalent to
recovering from our estimations a threshold value for H such that
d°y
dNatural
= ®4 ¡ ®8 ¢ Human ¸ 0 (7)
In Table 5 we ﬁnd that human capital always oﬀsets the negative eﬀects of natural
resources on economic growth, and this oﬀsetting eﬀect is increasing in the level of
human capital. Moreover, it is possible that this negative eﬀect turns positive for
economies with enough human capital. However, the point estimates of the number
of years of schooling that fully oﬀset the negative impact of natural resources range
from 2.7 (in equation 5.7) to 10.2 years (in equation 5.6). On the one hand, this
could imply that natural resources hamper economic growth and that, according
to our model, human capital may only partly oﬀset the negative eﬀect of natural
resources. On the other hand, the most optimistic view would conclude that the
eﬀect of natural resources on growth is positive, given the low level of human capital



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23lies between these two positions. Thus it would be correct to argue that natural
resources could hamper growth in countries with low levels of human capital, but
that in economies with an abundance of human capital, natural resources could propel
growth.
Taking the average of the coeﬃcients estimated in equations 5.4 to 5.7 suggests
that 5.5 years of schooling is the minimum required for natural resources to have a
net positive eﬀect on growth.
Table 6 lists those countries for which data are available for the full sample period
whose level of human capital is above the threshold (5.5 years) at which natural
resources begin to exert a positive eﬀect on growth. Table 6 also shows, at ﬁve-year
intervals, natural resources exports as a fraction of these countries’ GDP (
XNR
Y ) and
of their total exports (
XNR
TX ). Especially interesting are those countries (indicated by
asterisks) whose natural resources exports by these measures are above the sample
average.
Perhaps the most striking observation to be made in Table 6 is that some countries
that known to be richly endowed with natural resources nevertheless have a small
share of exports of primary products in GDP . Among these are Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Wright
(1990) argues that, over the period 1880-1920, the distinctive characteristic of U.S.
exports was their intensity in nonrenewable natural resources. Nevertheless, for the
period 1879-99, he ﬁnds that net manufacturing exports depend negatively on natural
resources, whereas for the period 1909-40 this relationship is reversed. Can human
capital accumulation explain this process? Our evidence supports such a hypothesis.
Certainly, whether the same history applies to some of the countries in Table 6, and if
so, to which ones, is a question that deserves a closer look and which we will explore
in future research.
In short, the evidence seems to indicate that natural resources are a hindrance to
economic growth in countries with low levels of human capital. Our model predicts
that this eﬀect comes about because the natural resources sector draws resources
from other economic sectors that could generate further economic growth. However,
as the country’s development continues, the accumulation of human capital may
eliminate this eﬀect. Hence the impact of natural resources could be oﬀset through




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We have found an inverse relationship between a country’s rate of economic growth
and the relative abundance of its natural resources, and a positive relationship be-
tween level of income and natural resources. These ﬁndings agree with the main
predictions of our model. Moreover, in contrast to other empirical work, we ﬁnd
statistical evidence of a positive relationship between human capital and economic
growth after controlling for natural resource abundance.19 Based on the model’s pre-
dictions, we have also extended the usual speciﬁcations of economic growth regressions
by incorporating a term that interacts human capital and natural resources. This al-
lows us to derive a list of countries that, today or in the past, have been relatively
rich in natural resources and human capital, and whose levels of human capital more
than oﬀset the expected negative eﬀect of natural resource abundance on growth.
The results indicate that natural resources reduce economic growth in countries
with low levels of human capital, although there is a positive income eﬀect. The neg-
ative eﬀects on growth arise as the natural resources sector draws economic resources
from other sectors that would otherwise be capable of generating further economic
growth. Our model and the evidence we have presented show that the main resource
that is siphoned oﬀ from these growth-enhancing activities is human capital. If human
capital is abundant, however, this eﬀect may be minimized.
Indeed, our evidence strongly suggests that abundant human capital not only par-
tially compensates for the negative eﬀects of abundant natural resources on economic
growth, as implied by our model, but may actually more than oﬀset it. In our model
a high level of human capital diminishes the growth-reducing eﬀect of the reallocation
of resources from a dynamic sector, such as industry, to the exploitation of natural
resources. Further work is needed to fully account for this evidence. It may be pos-
sible, in a multisector model with close interlinkages between natural resources and
industrial activities, to formalize the idea of the joint development of an industrial or
high-technology sector simultaneously with natural resources, if the economy is rich
in human capital. This is what may have happened in Scandinavia, wherethe devel-
opment of natural resources was accompanied by growth of an industrial base linked
to the natural resources sector, for example in forestry (wood and pulp processing).
19See Sachs and Warner (1995), Gylfason et al. (1999), and Asea and Lahiri (1999).
26For such a synergy to occur, however, the country must be well endowed with human
capital.
The aggregate data, as well as our review of the Scandinavian experience since
the late nineteenth century, provide supporting evidence for our model. In addition,
we have shown that abundance of natural resources leads to higher income, so that
one cannot infer from the growth eﬀects alone what the welfare implications of being
rich in natural resources might ultimately be. Indeed, from the perspective of our
model, increased natural resources imply higher current and future income, so that
welfare increases when natural resources become more abundant. A country would
not beneﬁt from giving away its natural resource endowment, as one might mistakenly
conclude from models that emphasize only the growth eﬀect.
As this paper has shown, a country that is rich in natural resources can start
with a high level of income, accumulate human capital, and see its growth accelerate.
In this sense, natural resources need not be a curse. However, extremely low levels
of human capital may cause such an economy to stagnate, because it then tends to
specialize in natural resources extraction.
References
Asea, Patrick and Amartya Lahiri, “The Precious Bane,” Journal of Economic Dy-
namic and Control, April 1999, 23 (5-6), 823–49.
Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala i Martin, Economic Growth, Mc Graw Hill, 1995.
, Gregory Mankiw, and Xavier Sala i Martin, “Capital Mobility in Neoclassical
Models of Economic Growth,” American Economic Review, 1995, 85 (1), 103–
115.
Benavot, Aaron and Phyllis Riddle, “The Expansion of Primary Education, 1870-
1940: Trends and Issues,” Sociology of Education, July 1988, pp. 191–210.
Blomstrom, Magnus and Patricio Meller, eds, Trayectorias Divergentes. Comparaci´ on
de un siglo de desarrollo econ´ omico Latinoamericano y Escandinavo, Cieplan-
Hachette, 1990. Santiago.
27Boughton, James, “Commodity and Manufactures Prices in the Long Run,” May
1991. International Monetary Found Working Paper, 91/47,.
Bravo-Ortega, Claudio, “Does Geography Matters for the Big Push. Why Scandi-
navia and not Latin America?,” 1999. Mimeo Berkeley.
Caselli, Francesco, Gerald Esquivel, and Lefort Fernando, “Reopening the Conver-
gence Debate: A new Look at Cross Country Growth Empirics,” Journal of
Economic Growth, 1996, 1 (3), 363–89.
Chenery, Hollis B. and Moche Syrquin, Patterns of Development. 1950-1970, London:
Oxford University Press, 1975.
Davis, Graham, “Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the Mineral
Economies,” World Development, 1995, 23 (10), 1765–79.
Easterly, William, Pritchett Kremer, Michael Lant, and Lawrence Summers, “Good
Policy or Good Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, December 1993, 32 (3), 459–83.
Edwards, Sebastian, “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What do we really
know?,” March 1997. National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA)
Working Paper No 5978.
Farzin, Y.H, “Optimal saving policy for exhaustible resource economies,” Journal of
Development Economics, February 1999, 58 (1), 149–84.
Feenstra, Robert, Dorsati Madani, Tzu-Han Yang, and Chi-Yuan Liang, “Testing
Endogenous Growth in South Korea and Taiwan,” May 1997. National Bureau
of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA) Working Paper No. 6028.
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, “Natural resources, Education and Economic Development,”
European Economic Review, May 2001, 45 (4-6), 847–59.
and Gylﬁ Zoega, “Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of
Investment,” January 2002. Paper presented at the Central Bank of Chile and
World Bank Conference on Economic Growth and Natural Resources. Santiago,
Chile.
28, Thor Herbertsson, and Gylﬁ Zoega, “A Mixed Blessing: Natural Resources
and Economic Growth,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1999, 3 (2), 204–25.
Heckscher, Eli, An Economic History of Sweden, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968.
Krueger, Alan and Mikael Lindahl, “Education for Growth: Why and For Whom?,”
February 1999. Mimeo Princeton University.
Krugman, Paul, Rethinking International Trade, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1990.
Lane, Philip and Aaron Tornell, “Power, Growth, and the Voracity Eﬀect,” Journal
of Economic Growth, June 1996, 1 (2), 213–41.
Leamer, Edward, “Can FTAA Suspend the Law of Gravity and Give Americas High
Growth and Better Income Distributions?,” March 2003. UCLA Draft.
Lederman, Daniel and William Maloney, “Trade Structure and Growth,” September
2002. World Bank, Draft.
Lucas Jr., Robert, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, July 1988, 22 (1), 3–42.
Maddison, Angus, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, Paris: OECD, 1995.
Maloney, William F., “Innovation and Growth in Resource Rich Countries,” Econo-
mia, January 2002, 3 (1), 111–168.
Manzano, Osmel and Roberto Rigobon, “Resorce Curse or Debt Overhang,” July
2001. NBER Working Paper No. 8390.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, “Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and
Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Theory, December 1992, 58 (2), 317–
34.
Michel, Phillipe, “On the Transversality Condition in Inﬁnite Horizon Optimal Prob-
lems,” Econometrica, July 1982, 50 (4), 975–86.
29Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics: Americas 1750–1993, New York:
Stockton Press, 1998.
, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750–1993, New York: Stockton
Press, 1998.
Mundlak, Yair, Agriculture and Economic growth. Theory and Measurement., Har-
vard University Press., 2001.
Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “Industrialization and the Big
Push,” Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97 (5), 1003–26.
Neary, Peter and Sweder Van Wijnbergen, Natural Resources and the Macroeconomy,
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986.
O’Rourke, Kevin and Jeﬀrey Williamson, “Education, Globalization and Catch up:
Scandinavia in the Swedish mirror,” Scandinavian Economic History Review,
1995, 43 (3), 287–309.
Rodriguez, Francisco and Jeﬀrey Sachs, “Why do resource abundant Economies Grow
More Slowly?,” Journal of Economic Growth, September 1999, 4 (3), 277–303.
Romer, Paul, “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth,” Journal of Political
Economy, October 1986, 94 (5), 1002–37.
Sachs, Jeﬀrey and Andrew Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth,” December 1995. NBER Working Paper No. 5398.
and , “The Big Push, Natural resources Booms and Economic Growth.,”
Journal of Development Economics, 1999, 59 (1), 47–76.
and , “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic Review, May
2001, 45 (4-6), 827–38.
Solow, Robert, “Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources,” Review of
Economic Studies, Symposium, 1974, pp. 29–45.
Stijns, Jean Philippe, “Natural Resource Abundance and Human Capital Accumu-
lation,” June 2001. Mimeo, UC Berkeley.
30Temple, Johnathan, “The New Growth Evidence,” Journal of Economic Literature,
March 1999, 37 (1), 112–56.
Vincent, Jeﬀrey, “Resource depletion and economic sustaintability in Malaysia,”
Enviroment and Development Economics, 1997, 2 (1), 19–37.
Wright, Gavin, “The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940,” The Amer-
ican Economic Review, September 1990, 80 (4), 651–68.
31Appendix A
Model Derivation and Proofs of Propositions
The Hamiltonian of the problem in equation 3 (3) can be expressed as follows:
J = u(c) ¢ e¡¯t + ¸ ¢ e¡¯t(a ¢ HI + p1 ¢ R ¢ H±
R ¡ p2 ¢ c) + ¿2 ¢ e¡¯t(HI + HR ¡ 1 ¢ H)
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem are given by
dJ
dct
= 0 , u
0(c)e




= 0 , ¸ ¢ e
¡¯t ¢ a + e
¡¯t ¢ ¿2 = 0 (9)
dJ
dHR
= 0 , ¸ ¢ e
¡¯tp1 ¢ R ¢ ± ¢ H
±¡1
R + e
¡¯t ¢ ¿2 = 0 (10)
dJ
dH
= ¡˙ ¸ + ¸¯ = ¡¿2 )
¡˙ ¸
¸






= a ¡ ¯ (11)
Hence we can express the return to human capital accumulation as follows:
rH = ¡
¿2
¸ = a = p1 ¢ ± ¢ R ¢ H
±¡1
R
From the previous expression we can note that HR is constant over time. We will
explore further the implicances of this fact in proposition 2.




J(t) = 0 as long as a < ¯(1 + ¾)
Proof. Proposition 1






(a ¡ ¯) (12)
Note that the rate of growth of consumption is constant at any moment in time
and depends on the technology utilized in the industrial sector.
Now we derive the steady-state growth rates for each variable. Dividing the budget














Imposing the fact that in the steady state the rates of variation of human capital and
consumption are constant, noting that HR is constant and taking the derivative with
respect to time, we get
0 =
˙ H

























Then, in the steady state, human capital and consumption will grow at the same
rate. The amount of human capital in the natural resources sector will be constant,
33whereas that of human capital in the industrial sector will grow at the same rate
as total human capital. Consequently the “reduced” product will also grow at the
same rate. It is important to note that the evolution of the variables in the steady
state does not depend on the relative abundance of natural resources, and that the
growth rate of the economy depends only on the productivity of the sector subject
to externalities.
Proof. Proposition 2
The ﬁrst-order conditions have some interesting implications with respect to the
evolution of the productive structure of the economy. To analyze these, we ﬁrst solve
HR, which can be expressed as follows:
HR =
µ




= constant = LR ¢ H (16)
where LR is the fraction of the labor force in the natural resources sector. Note that
the fraction of human capital employed in the natural resources sector is inversely
proportional to the level of human capital per capita, H . Consistent with this, the
industrial sector will produce output using a share LI of the labor force, which will
increase with H. Indeed,









At the same time, the output of the natural resources sector is constant, and as
long as human capital is increasing, the fraction of total output belonging to this
sector will decrease over time.
34Proof. Proposition 3















HR(R) + p1 ¢ H
±






Rearranging the equilibrium conditions for the allocation of labor in the productive
sectors as p1 ¢ R ¢ ± ¢ H
±¡1




(Y0) = p1 ¢ H
±
R(R) > 0 (19)
Transitional dynamics










Hi ) = d
dt(a + B















Hi = Ã ¡ Â, we can express equation (20) as:
˙ Ã = (a ¡ Ã) ¢ (Ã ¡ Â)
35Diﬀerentiating Â respect to time yields




HI , replacing in the growth rate of consumption implies
˙ C
HI = C
¾HI(a ¡ ¯) =
Â
¾(a ¡ ¯)
˙ Â + Â ¢ (Ã ¡ Â) =
Â
¾(a ¡ ¯)
Hence the system evolves according to the following two diﬀerential equations:




(a ¡ ¯) ¡ Â ¢ (Ã ¡ Â) (22)
From proposition 1 we know that, in the steady state, all the variables grow at the
same rate. Therefore ˙ Ã = ˙ Â = 0, which replaced in equations (21) and (22) allow us
to ﬁnd the steady-state values for each of our variables. These are then determined
by




¡ Ãss + Âss) = 0 (24)
Then the system has three steady states: two for consumption equal to zero, and
one for positive consumption. Indeed, the solutions to the equations (23) and (24)
are




¾ ;Ã = a
ª
















a ¡ 2 ¢ Ãss + Âss ¡(a ¡ Ãss)
¡Âss
1















Around the steady state fÃss = 0;Âss = 0g the system is completely unstable.
When the equilibrium is fÂss = 0;Ãss = agthe system is completely stable, whereas




¾ ;Ãss = a
ª
; the system has a saddle path as
long as (¡a + ¯) < 0 and 1
¾(a ¡ ¯) + 2 ¢
¡a+¯+¾a
¾ ¡ a =
¡a+¯+¾a
¾ > 0; which seems to
be a plausible assumption given standard values for the parameters of the model.
However, noting that the minimum possible value for Ã is a; the equilibria fÃ = 0;Â = 0g
is unfeasible. Given that the second equilibrium is fully stable, we will analyze the
dynamic around the third, unstable equilibrium.





































The solution for the system is the following:
Â = Âss + (Â0 ¡ Âss) ¢ e
¡ 1
¾(a¡¯)¢t (26)
















Figure 1 shows the dynamic under the assumptions needed for having the third
equilibrium with a saddle path.
Now we derive the growth rate for income per capita, expressing it as a function
of the variables used in linearizing the system. Thus we obtain
°y = °Ã + °hi (28)
From the original system of equations we have
°Ã = °hi ¢ ( a
Ã ¡ 1) = °hi ¢ (
Ãss
Ã ¡ 1)
Thus, replacing in equation (28)
°y = °Ã ¢ (1 + (
Ã
Ãss¡Ã)) = °Ã ¢ (
Ãss
Ãss¡Ã)











Ã ¢ (1 + (
Ã
Ãss¡Ã))




) ¢ °ss =
Hi
Y
¢ Ãss ¢ °ss (29)
38After some algebra, and recalling the fact that Ãss = a and that °ss is the steady-




¢ °ss = (1 ¡ Xnr) ¢ °ss = °ss ¡ °ss ¢ Xnr (30)
Hence we have derived the inclusion of natural resources exports as a fraction of
GDP (or of total exports) as an explanatory variable. This may be considered an
extension of previous empirical speciﬁcations existing in the literature.
Thus, to prove proposition 4, we can diﬀerentiate equation (29).
Proof. Result 1
From proposition 3 we have
d
dR
(Y0) = p1 ¢ H
±
R(R) > 0 (31)
Now we can express human capital allocated to the industrial sector as a function




Therefore we can express the total derivative of the growth rate with respect to
the speciﬁc factor in the natural resources sector as follows:
d
dR













@R(Hi) < 0 and @
@R(Y ) > 0, we proved that d
dR(°y(R;H;Z)) < 0
39Now, after some manipulation of d
dR(°y(R;H;Z)), we can derive d2
dhdR(°y(R;H;Z)),







R ¢ (2 ¢
YI
YTotal









If R is big enough, the fraction of production in the industrial sector is small (the
same can be argued for low levels of human capital) and the ﬁrst term becomes nega-
tive. On the other hand, for any value of R there exists a level of human capital such
that equation (33) is positive, because the fraction of GDP belonging to the industrial
sector is an increasing function of the level of human capital accumulation. Whether
the total eﬀect is negative will depend on the parameters. What is guaranteed is the
existence of H¤ > 0, such that 8 H > H¤ the cross diﬀerentiation is positive.
Natural Resources and zero growth
In this section we assume that, given the productivity of each of the two sectors,
and given the initial level of human capital, the economy will produce in the natural
resources sector only. For that we need to impose that given the population in the
economy, the marginal productivity of human capital in the natural resources sector




1¡± > H0: We also assume that ¯ > a:
40Note that the ﬁrst condition simply implies a relative abundance of natural re-
sources with respect to the factor speciﬁc to the industrial sector. Hence there may
be cases where this relative abundance can induce greater welfare even in the ab-
sence of growth, when compared with the alternative of nonproduction in the natural
resources sector but a positive growth rate.









˙ H = p1RH±
R ¡ Ct
(34)
After redeﬁning constants and variables in per capita terms, the problem reduces
to imposing ﬁrst-order conditions over the following Hamiltonian:
J = u(Ct) ¢ e¡¯t + ¸ ¢ e¡¯t(pRH± ¡ ct)
dJ
dct = 0 , u0(ct)e¡¯t = ¸
dJ
dH = ¡˙ ¸ + ¸¯ = ¸p1±RH±¡1 ) ¡˙ ¸
¸ + ¯ = p1±RH±¡1
Proof. Proposition 4
Taking the logarithm and diﬀerentiating dJ







±¡1 ¡ ¯) (35)
As usual, in the steady state the economy grows at a rate of zero, because the
ﬁrm utilizes human capital up to the point at which decreasing returns to human
41capital equal the discount rate of the representative agent. Consequently, there is no
incentive for human capital accumulation. If there is more human capital than can
be utilized in the natural resources sector, there may even be a deaccumulation of
human capital.
To analyze the steady-state growth rates, we divide by H and diﬀerentiate the








0 = 0 ¡ Ct
H (°c ¡ °H)
Thus, we have
°c = °H = 0: (36)
42Appendix B: Data
Penn World Tables, version 5.6: Real GDP per capita in constant dollars, base 1985
(RGDPCH), Real investment share of GDP (I), Real government share of GDP
(G), Openness (Exports+Imports)/GDP (OPEN)
Barro and Lee Database, 1994.: Average years of schooling in the total population
over age 25 (HUMAN), Average years of schooling in the male population over
age 25 (HUMAN (MALE)), Average years of secondary schooling in the total
population over age 25 (SYR)
World Tables CD Rom, 1993-1996. The following variables
Exports of Fuel: Comprise commodities in SITC Revision 1, Section 3 (mineral fuels
and lubricants and related materials); (TX VAL FUEL CD)
Exports of Non Fuel Primary Products: commodities in SITC Revision 1, Sections
0,1,2,4, and Division 68 (food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, inedible
crude materials, oils, fats, waxes, and nonferrous metals); (TX VAL NFPP CD).
Exports of Metals and Minerals: Exports of metals and minerals comprise com-
modities in SITC Revision 1, Sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals nes), 28
(metalliferous ores, scrap) and 68 (nonferrous metals); (TX VAL METM CD).
GDP at Market Prices: Measures the total output of goods and services for ﬁnal
43use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the
allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser
values (market prices) is the sum of GDP at factor cost and indirect taxes less
subsidies. Data are expressed in current U.S. dollars.
The ﬁgures for GDP are dollar values converted from domestic currencies using
single-year oﬃcial exchange rates. For a few countries where the oﬃcial exchange
rate does not reﬂect the rate eﬀectively applied to actual foreign transactions, an
alternative conversion factor is used.
Merchandise Exports: refer to all movable goods (excluding nonmonetary gold)
involved in a change of ownership from residents to nonresidents. Merchandise
exports are valued free on board (f.o.b) at the customs frontier and include
the value of the goods, the value of outside packaging, and related distributive
services used up to, and including, loading the goods onto the carrier at the
customs frontier of the exporting country. (TX VAL MRCH CD)
The primary source is the UNCTAD database supplemented with data from
the UN COMTRADE database, IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and
national and other sources. Because of the source Change, the data for some
countries may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those presented last year. Also, export
and import component values may not sum to the total shown.
Merchandise Imports: Merchandise imports refer to all movable goods (exclud-
44ing nonmonetary gold) involved in a change of ownership from nonresidents
to residents. Merchandise imports are valued at their c.i.f. (cost, insurance
and freight) price. In principle, this price is equal to the f.o.b. transac-
tion price plus the costs of freight and merchandise insurance involved in
shipping goods beyond the f.o.b. point. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
The primary source is the UNCTAD database supplemented with data from the UN
COMTRADE database, IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and national
and other sources. Because of the source Change, the data for some countries
may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those presented last year. Also, export and import
component values may not sum to the total shown.(TM VAL MRCH CD).
All the previous variables are expressed in current U.S.$ dollars.
Merchandise Export Price Index: This item is a price index measuring changes in the
aggregate price level of a country’s merchandise exports f.o.b. over time.(TX
PRI MRCH XD).
Merchandise Import Price Index: This item is a price index measuring changes in the
aggregate price level of a country’s merchandise imports c.i.f. over time.(TM
PRI MRCH XD).
45Figure 2: Growth and Natural Resource Abundance
Figure 3: Income and Natural Resource Abundance.
46Figure 4: Phase diagram.
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